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Major League Baseball (MLB) organizations spend millions of dollars each year on 
athletes with the end goal of winning a World Series title. However when an organization signs a 
player to a long term contract are they actually receiving the production that they paid for? Under 
the MLB’s current form of player compensation players may not be properly motivated or at 
least not motivated to perform at their highest level. 
The intent of this thesis was to apply expectancy theory in assessing Major League 
Baseball’s current form of player compensation. It evaluates how well players are currently 
motivated to perform on the field, and if any improvements can be made. This is done through 
the statistical analysis of MLB organizations yearly salary data, yearly win-loss record, and the 
performance of 65 players two years prior to, one year prior to, and during their first contract 
term directly following or extending past arbitration eligibility. Evidence shows that player 
motivation, especially for position players, can be increased and several suggestions are made as 
to how this can be improved and how MLB organizations can increase the odds of player 
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Definition of Terms 
BA= Batting Average= Hits/ At Bats 
SLG= Slugging Percentage= (1B + 2*2B + 3*3B + 4*HR) / At Bats  
OBP= On-Base Percentage= (Hits + Walks + Hit By Pitch) / (At Bats + Walks + Hit By Pitch + 
Sacrifice Fly) 
FPCT= Fielding Percentage= (Putouts + Assists) / (Putouts + Assists + Errors) 
WAR= Wins Above Replacement= Represents the number of wins a player adds to their team 
above what a replacement player would add 
ERA= Earned Run Average= (9 * Earned Runs) / Innings Pitched 
K/9= Strikeouts Per Nine Innings Pitched= (9 * Strikeouts) / Innings Pitched 
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 Since the creation of free agency in 1976 player salaries in Major League Baseball 
(MLB) have increased immensely. The average MLB salary in 1976 was $51,501 (Holtzman, 
2012) and grew to $3,440,000 in 2012 (MLB Salaries). That’s an astronomical 6,679% increase. 
Due to the large amount of money involved in player contracts today, it has become more 
important than ever for teams to get production out of their highly paid athletes. This brings 
about the question of whether or not MLB organizations actually get what they pay for when 
signing a free-agent player to a long term contract. David Ahlstrom, et. al (1999, pg 181) 
suggests that “if Major League Baseball teams pay free agents based on free-agent-year 
performance, they might not be satisfied with the result.” This may be due to the fact that under 
Major League Baseball’s current form of player compensation players are not properly 
motivated.  
 This study will apply expectancy theory in assessing Major League Baseball’s current 
form of player compensation. It will evaluate how well players are currently motivated to 
perform on the field and if any improvements can be made. Previous studies in the area of 
expectancy theory and MLB player compensation have focused on “non-pitchers” (Ahlstrom, et. 
al, 1999; Duchon and Jago, 1981; Martin, et. al, 2011) or position players. This prevents the 
researchers from getting a full view of MLB player compensation as they are left without data 
from about 1/3 of the player pool. This study will analyze both position players and starting 
pitchers, using a set of statistical categories including wins above replacement (WAR) to 
compare the two. In order to better evaluate how player’s performance and motivation are 
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affected by long term contracts, player performance will be measured using the season two years 
prior to the new contract, the season prior to the new contract, the first, middle, and last season of 
their first contract that starts the year following or extends past their arbitration eligibility (given 
that the contract is three years or longer), and career averages. This builds upon the research of 
Ahlstrom, et. al, (1999), Martin, et. al, (2011), who evaluated performance of all position players 
during the year prior to free-agency, year of free-agency, and year following free-agency. By 
exploring player performance throughout their first contract extending past arbitration eligibility 
this will enable one to see how performance and motivation differ during the first, middle, and 
last year(s) of a contract. Previous studies (Ahlstrom, et. al 1999; Martin, et al, 2011) were able 
to make conclusions on a player’s motivation to perform when signing a long-term contract but 




Motivation in Sports 
 For years scholars have been trying to figure out what motivates a player (regardless of 
sport) to perform. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the topic of motivation in 
sports. Prior research attempting to compare the link between pay and performance has focused 
on the process theories of motivation. These theories include equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) 
and expectancy theory (Porter and Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). However none have examined 
player motivation using only expectancy theory. Instead the large majority of scholars have used 
equity theory or a combination of equity theory and expectancy theory to evaluate player 
motivation. Originally player motivation in the MLB was measured using only equity theory, but 
through extensive research on the topic, researchers have found that expectancy theory has a 
stronger link to motivation and player performance in the MLB than equity theory. 
Equity Theory 
 The theory is based on the comparison of perceived inputs and outputs. Inequity is 
perceived to exist when a person believes that the ratio of his or her outcomes (pay) to inputs 
(performance) differs from the ratio of a referent other’s outcomes to inputs (Adams, 1965). A 
“referent other” could include a co-worker (teammate) or some other peer (player on different 
team). Adams (1965) summarized his theory to show that an individual goes through the 
following train of thought: 1) An individual perceives inequity, which creates tension. 2) This 
tension is directly proportional to the magnitude of the inequity. 3) The strength of the 
individual’s motivation to reduce the inequity is proportional to the magnitude of the inequity.  
Put differently, when individuals feel as though they are being treated unfairly (under-paid) in 
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comparison to their peers they will attempt to restore a balance between their inputs and 
outcomes and the inputs and outcomes of a referent other. Adams (1965) hypothesized a set of 
responses that individuals engage in to restore equity. These include: 1) changing one’s own 
inputs or outcomes; 2) changing the inputs or outcomes of the referent other; 3) cognitively 
distorting the inputs or outcomes; 4) changing the referent other; or 5) leaving the situation.  
Equity Theory in Major League Baseball 
 The first study to test motivation of MLB players using equity theory was conducted by 
Lord and Hohenfeld (1979). Their sample consisted of 23 position players in the MLB who 
chose to play out their options by not signing a contract before the start of the 1977 season. Of 
this sample, 10 signed during the 1976 season and 13 played the entire season without a contract 
and participated in the free-agent draft after the 1976 season. These players were referred to as 
“signers” and “non-signers.” The performance data of these players as well as their teammates 
were compiled for the seasons between 1973 and 1977. They found that the performance of both 
signers and non-signers declined in 1976 as compared to their performance in 1975 and then 
increased in 1977. These results were believed to be caused by the player’s feelings of inequity 
in 1976 caused by their underpayment relative to other players. The increase in performance in 
1977 was a result of the players receiving new contracts with higher salaries. Lord and 
Hohenfeld concluded that these findings provided support for equity theory.    
 Robert Lord conducted another study using equity theory to examine the motivation of 
MLB players in 1989, this time with Neil Hauenstein. The study specifically tested “the effects 
of final-offer arbitration on the performance of Major League Baseball players” (Hauenstein and 
4 
 
Lord, 1989 pg. 147). In order to test this, Hauenstein and Lord used a sample of 88 MLB players 
(40 pitchers and 48 nonpitchers) who had a salary dispute settled by final-offer arbitration 
between the years of 1978 and 1984. The offensive performance data of these players were 
gathered at three separate points; 1) career average up to but not including the season prior to 
arbitration, 2) average performance in the season prior to arbitration, and 3) average performance 
during the postarbitration season. Other relevant player data included the age of the player and 
his years of experience in the major leagues at the time of arbitration. They found that 
“arbitration losers showed greater performance decrements relative to arbitration winners” 
(Hauenstein and Lord, 1989 pg. 158). This meant that those who received less money than they 
had expected through salary arbitration performed at a lower level than those who received more 
than expected. Hauenstein and Lord also concluded that the change in postarbitration 
performance was related to the magnitude of the discrepancy between monetary figures. 
Expectancy Theory 
 According to Vroom (1964), motivation is a factor of an individual’s expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence. Where expectancy is a person’s perception of his or her ability to 
accomplish an objective, instrumentality is a person’s perception of whether or not they will be 
rewarded for accomplishing that objective and valence is the value a person places on the 
outcome or reward. In general, the higher one’s expectancy or value of the outcome or reward, 
and the stronger the link between the outcome and reward, the better the chance of motivation. 
Stated differently, one’s effort to perform is a variable measured by one’s ability (or perceived 
ability) to complete a task (expectancy), the idea one will receive a reward upon completion of 
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the task (instrumentality), and the value the person places on this reward (valence). “Expectancy 
theory assumes that people have well-defined preferences among various outcomes (rewards) of 
their actions, and they will adjust their efforts based on those expected outcomes” (Ahlstrom et. 
al, 1999, pg. 185). Vroom (1964) argued that a clear and strong link between pay and 
performance will aid in leading to increased motivation. This link between pay and performance 
is known as instrumentality. If there is a strong link between pay and performance, for example a 
factory worker who is paid based on how many widgets he creates, then there is said to be high 
instrumentality. According to Vroom (1964) that worker will be motivated to create as many 
widgets as possible since it will lead to an increase in pay, given that pay is important to the 
individual (valence). The effects of instrumentality were evaluated by Georgopoulos et. al (1957) 
in a study of a unionized appliance factory. The study found that workers who reported high pay-
performance outcome instrumentality tended to be higher producers than those who didn’t. 
Similar results were obtained in a study by Jorgenson et. al (1973), in which they manipulated 
performance-outcome instrumentality by paying employees in a temporary organization on either 
an hourly basis (represented low instrumentality) or on a piece-rate basis (high instrumentality). 
They found that the high-instrumentality group performed better than the low-instrumentality 
group. To ensure that this was not a result of the members in each group, the groups were asked 
to switch places. The same results were obtained; the high-instrumentality group exceeded the 
low-instrumentality group in output and also exceeded its own previous performance under low-
instrumentality conditions. Both studies provide evidence that high-instrumentality leads to 
higher motivation and therefore higher performance.  However, there have been some criticisms 
of Vroom’s model based on its simplicity. In particular Porter and Lawler (1968) assert that 
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Vroom’s model does not take into consideration a person’s own traits and abilities and role 
perceptions when assessing the link between effort and performance. Lawler and Jenkins (1992) 
explain that expectancy theory can be deceptively simple, in the sense that it can lead you to 
believe that all an organization needs to do in order to increase productivity is relate a reward to 
an obtainable level of performance. However, this is only true if the individual places a high 
value (valence) on the reward.  The main difficulty associated with using expectancy theory to 
assess motivation is determining an individual’s valence. This is because everyone’s valence of a 
reward is different. It is a function of an individual’s needs, wants, goals, and values.   
Expectancy Theory in Major League Baseball 
 The first to test expectancy theory’s principles to evaluate the motivation of MLB players 
were Duchon and Jago (1981). They had initially set out to extend the research of Lord and 
Hohenfeld (1979), testing all non-pitchers (30 players in all) in the first three years of baseball’s 
free-agency system. However, their results contradicted equity theory’s predictions in that player 
performance increased for those in their free-agent year in 1977 and 1978. Consequently, they 
decided to recast the results using expectancy theory. They concluded that the effects of equity 
theory had only been important in the first year of the new free agency system, when players 
were not sure what sort of contracts they would receive. However once the pay-performance link 
had been well established, expectancy effects became increasingly important, suggesting that 
players would strive to improve their bargaining positions in their free-agent year. These findings 
are crucial because they imply that expectancy theory is more heavily tied to player motivation 
in the context of MLB than equity theory.  
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 Harder (1992) also studied equity and expectancy theories’ effects in MLB. His study 
included all MLB players from 1976 to 1988. Both of Harder’s hypotheses were related to equity 
theory. However, some of his findings can be related to expectancy theory. The relevant findings 
include “career runs created and career runs created per season were significant positive 
predictors of logged salaries each year, which shows that major-league baseball is a pay-for-
performance context” (Harder, 1992, pg. 326). He also found that “Being eligible for free agency 
the following season had a significant negative effect on runs created in 1987 and 1988, counter 
to what expectancy theory predicts” (Harder, 1992, pg. 330). This finding is contradictory to 
those of others (Ahstrom et. al, 1999; Duchon and Jago,1981; Martin et. al, 2011) and to the 
basis of expectancy theory since according to the theory one would predict that  players would 
perform at a higher level the year before being eligible for free-agency in order to increase their 
chances of signing a large contract (in terms of monetary compensation).  
 Possibly the largest study of expectancy theory in the context of MLB player motivation 
was conducted by Ahlstrom et. al (1999). They too used both equity theory and expectancy 
theory, but were the first to test hypotheses directly related to expectancy theory. The sample for 
the study consisted of nonpitcher MLB free agents from 1976 to 1992 who signed contracts with 
new teams, 172 in all. The study compared player performance during; 1) free-agent year vs. 
previous year’s performance, 2) free-agent year vs. career average, 3) 1st year of new contract vs. 
free-agent year, and 4) 1st year of new contract vs. career average. In relation to these 
comparisons they formed four hypotheses with respect to equity theory and expectancy theory; 
1) Player performance will be higher in the free-agent year than in previous years, 2) A player’s 
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performance will be higher in his free-agent year than his career average, 3) Player performance 
will be lower in the 1st year of the new contract than in the previous free-agent year, and 4) A 
player’s performance will be lower in the 1st year of his new contract than his career average. 
The results of the study gave some support to hypotheses 3 and 4 in relation to expectancy 
theory, showing that batting performance does indeed decline during the 1st year of a new 
contract. The results of this study have major implications for MLB contracts as it suggests that 
“guaranteed contracts harm player motivation, ostensibly by weakening the link between pay and 
performance, and particularly in the 1st year or two of a contract” (Ahlstrom et al., 1999 pg. 191). 
 A study conducted by Martin et. al (2011) provides further support for the findings of 
Ahlstrom et. al (1999) that guaranteed long-term contracts harm player motivation. Their study 
consisted of the MLB free-agent classes from 1996 to 2008 who fit the following criteria; 1) The 
player signed a multi-year contract as a free agent with a MLB team, 2) the players primary 
position is not pitcher, 3) the player must have made at least 250 plate appearances in the season 
before his contract year, his contract year, and the first year of his new deal. Of the 293 players 
who fit the criteria, 160 were randomly selected to participate. “A comparison of the mean 
statistics also showed a sharp decline in performance in the year following the signing of a new 
contract. Postcontract-year performance dipped below precontract-year output. The tests found 
that this was a statistically significant drop in player performance in each instance” (Martin et al., 




MLB Player Measurement and Compensation 
 Major League Baseball organizations spend a great deal of time, effort, and money 
determining a player’s monetary value. Statistics from previous years are analyzed to evaluate 
current performance and make projections for the future. Since Micheal Lewis’s Moneyball 
(2003), the use of saber metrics to evaluate player performance has become extremely popular.  
Previously players were evaluated by scouts on categories such as mechanics and body form. 
These are still used today but to a lesser extent. Players are currently compensated based on a 
team’s analysis of past performance and future projections. Long-term contracts are given to 
high performing and high-potential athletes in order to “lock them up” and prevent a bidding war 
between teams later on. However, just because a player has performed well in the past does not 
guarantee that he will perform well in the future. Lackritz (1990) suggests that players should be 
paid on an annual basis and that their salary should be based on both their individual and team 
performance that year. From an expectancy theory standpoint this makes a lot of sense. Players 
will be motivated to perform at a high level in order to obtain higher compensation. It will be as 
if every year is a free-agent year. Dinerstein (2007) provides further evidence that players should 
be paid on a year-to-year or short term basis rather than long term. He says that players at the 
beginning of long-term contracts know that they have locked in specific salaries and may expect 
that that their current performance will have no impact on their compensation. This may explain 
why player performance decreases during the first year of a new contract. However Stankiewitcz 
(2009, pg. 82) findings contradict this view, “a player with a short-term contract will be less 
productive than a player with a long-term contract”. Although she does note that her model does 
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not differentiate between the different types of players in the MLB. Her findings may be a result 
of the fact that typically long-term contracts are given to high performing athletes whereas low 





 Three hypotheses will be tested by this study. Each one aimed at evaluating Major 
League Baseball’s current form of player compensation, and how well it motivates players to 
perform. Table 1 provides a summary of the hypotheses.  The hypotheses test expectancy 
theory’s principles and measure player performance and motivation before, during, and after 
signing a new contract. Expectancy theory predicts that if a player perceives a strong relationship 
between his performances and subsequent rewards such as the signing of a new contract (high 
instrumentality). He will be motivated to perform at a high level. However this assumes that the 
signing of a new contract and pay associated with it is of importance to that player. Therefore 
one can reason that as long as this is important to a player, then a player in the final year of a 
contract should be motivated to improve his performance. However after signing a contract, 
instrumentality is lessened, and thus his motivation to perform is reduced. The first hypothesis 
will test the difference between the last year of an existing contract and the first year of a new 
contract. Expectancy theory predicts that a player’s performance should be higher during the 
final year of the existing contract than the first year of the new contract. This is because 
instrumentality is lessened once a contract is signed. The second hypothesis will test whether 
player performance increases the closer a player gets to the end of their contract. Expectancy 
theory predicts that performance will increase the closer a player gets to the end of a contract, 
because instrumentality is increased. The final hypothesis will test whether multi-year contracts 
decrease a player’s motivation to perform during the first year(s) of a contract. This will be 
tested by comparing a player’s career averages to their performance during the first year(s) of a 
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contract. Career averages are used a base line for which to compare performance during the first 
few year(s). Expectancy theory predicts that long term contracts decrease a player motivation to 
perform because instrumentality is decreased, therefore performance statistics will be lower 
during the beginning of a contract than career averages.         
Table 1 Hypotheses 
Performance Comparison Hypothesis 
First year of new contract vs. Final year of 
existing contract 
Player performance is lower during the first year 
of a new contract than the final year of an existing 
contract. 
Early years of contract vs. Late years of contract Player performance increases the closer a player gets to the end of a contract period. 
Early years of contract vs. Career average 
Guaranteed multi-year contracts decrease a 
player’s motivation to perform during the first 
year/few years of the contract. 
*For position players a decrease in performance signifies a drop in each performance category. For starting pitchers a decrease in performance 





In order to gage the MLB’s current form of player motivation on team performance, a 
preliminary analysis consisting of all 30 teams in the MLB from 2000 to 2012 was conducted.  
Each team’s yearly player salary and regular season win-loss record was analyzed using a 
correlation. The sample for testing the hypotheses consisted of all position players and starting 
pitchers on an active MLB roster in 2012 who had previously signed a contract extending past or 
directly following their arbitration eligibility. The sample was limited to those players who also 
met the following criteria; 1) The player signed a contract of at least three years with a MLB 
team, 2) the player exceeded 130 at-bats (position players) or 50 innings pitched (starting 
pitchers) in the season two years prior to the new contract, the year prior to the new contract, and 
each year of their new contract. 130 at-bats and 50 innings pitched were chosen as they are 
recognized by the MLB as the qualifications to determine a player’s rookie status. In order to 
ensure accuracy of data only players who were on an active MLB roster in 2012 were included in 
this study. Contract information on players not on a team in 2012 was either incomplete or 
unattainable. Contract data was retrieved from Cotscontracts.com. In all 65 players fit the 
criteria, 45 position players and 20 starting pitchers. 
The performance data compiled for each position player included: batting average (BA), 
slugging percentage (SLG), on-base percentage (OBP), fielding percentage (FPCT), and wins 
above replacement (WAR). For starting pitchers the performance data compiled included: earned 
run average (ERA), strikeouts per nine innings pitched (K/9), walks and hits per innings pitched 
(WHIP), fielding percentage (FPCT), and wins above replacement (WAR). WAR will be used to 
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compare the performance of starting pitchers to position players. This is a great statistic since 
one can literally list how valuable a player is to their team, regardless of them being a pitcher or 
position player, based on their WAR. All performance data was retrieved from espn.com.    
     All performance measures were compiled for each player during the season two years 
prior to the new contract, the season prior to the new contract, first year of the new contract, 
middle year(s) of the contract, and final year of the new contract. In addition the career figures 
for each player were compiled. A repeated measures analysis of variance was used to analyze the 





In order to present a base line for the study a Pearson Correlation was run in order to see 
whether or not there is a direct correlation between Major League Baseball team’s yearly salaries 
and their on-field performance. On-field performance was measured using the number of wins 
each team earned per year. The Person Correlation is r=0.368 and p=.000, suggesting that there 
is a correlation between MLB team’s yearly salaries and their on-field performance. However 
this correlation is not perfect.  
Position Players 
 The results of the positions players repeated measures ANOVA as well as mean 
performance data are presented in Table 2 and 3.  






df Mean Square 
Greenhouse-
Geisser p 
BA .005 3.265 .001 1.984 .114 
SLG .043 3.242 .013 3.586 .013 
OBP .008 3.120 .003 2.509 .059 
FPCT .001 2.325 .000 1.475 .232 
































BA .277/.027 .291/.029 .282/.033 .283/.026 .282/.036 .282/.020 
SLG .447/.086 .483/.077 .456/.076 .459/.065 .444/.075 .456/.057 
OBP .348/.041 .365/.033 .355/.037 .360/.030 .352/.038 .355/.026 
FPCT .981/.019 .986/.011 .985/.012 .986/.011 .984/.017 .984/.012 
WAR 2.72/2.07 4.05/1.95 3.24/2.25 3.21/1.88 2.86/2.34 2.65/1.39 
The repeated measures ANOVA of position players showed a statistically significant 
difference between years for SLG and WAR, while OBP approached significance according to 
the Greenhouse-Geisser. For these statistics a Bonferroni post hoc test was run to show which 
years there was a statistically significant difference. This test showed that there was a statistically 
significant difference for SLG between the season one year prior to the new contract and the 
middle year(s) of the new contract (p=.031) and also the season one year prior to the new 
contract and the career averages (p=.001). For OBP the test showed a statistically significant 
difference between the season one year before the new contract and the career averages (p=.006). 
Finally, the test showed that for WAR there was a statistically significant difference between the 
season two years before the new contract and season one year prior to the new contract (p=.005),  
the season prior to the new contract and the middle year(s) of the new contract (p=.038), and the 
season prior to the new contract and the career averages (p=.000).  
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 Although the Bonferroni post hoc test for the repeated measures ANOVA did not show a 
statistically significant difference between any of the statistical categories for the season prior to 
the new contract and first season of the new contract, due to the large differences in means 
between the two years for BA, SLG, OBP, and WAR a paired samples t-test was run between the 
two years for each of the statistics. Interestingly each of the t-test’s came back significant; BA 
(p=.05), SLG (p=.009), OBP (p=.028), and WAR (p=.014). Graphs showing the differences 
between years for each statistical category are provided in the appendix. 
 The results of this study supported hypothesis 1 with respect to position players and in 
part hypothesis 2, however it did not support hypothesis 3. As mentioned above the repeated 
measure ANOVA did not show a statistically significant difference between the season before 
the new contract and the first season of the new contract however after running a paired sample 
t-test it was found that the difference in BA, SLG, OBP, and WAR were statistically significant. 
Just as the hypothesis and expectancy theory predicted player performance decreased between 
the year prior to a new contract and the first year of the new contract. This is evident both by 
viewing table 3 as well as the graphs in the appendix.  
Hypothesis two as well as expectancy theory had predicted that the closer a player gets to 
the end of a contract term the more their performance should improve due to an increase in 
instrumentality. This was supported in part by the fact that performance increased in each 
statistical category between the season two years prior to a new contract and the season prior to a 
new contract. Yet, the difference between means in the season two years prior to the season 
contract and one year prior to the new contract was only found to be statistically significant for 
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WAR. The hypothesis was only partially supported because there was no significant difference 
in means or statistically significant difference between the middle year(s) and the final year of 
the new contract. 
The third hypothesis was rejected as career performance figures for position players were 
lower than, or equal to the performance figures for each statistical category during the first year 
and middle year(s) of the new contract. Both the hypothesis and expectancy theory had predicted 
that performance would have been lower during the first few years of the new contract as related 
to career averages.     
Starting Pitchers 
The results of the starting pitchers repeated measures ANOVA as well as mean 
performance data are presented in Table 4 and 5. 






Df Mean Square 
Greenhouse-
Geisser p 
ERA 2.883 2.911 .991 1.715 .176 
K/9 5.639 2.985 1.889 2.046 .118 
WHIP .121 2.590 .047 2.146 .115 
FPCT .005 3.071 .001 .716 .550 





























ERA 4.08/.842 3.75/.859 3.59/.738 3.82/.559 3.96/.781 3.89/.364 
K/9 7.00/1.44 7.53/1.53 7.68/1.57 7.46/1.45 7.32/1.58 7.28/1.01 
WHIP 1.32/.135 1.28/.143 1.22/.152 1.25/.127 1.27/.155 1.28/.081 
FPCT .964/.053 .956/.044 .959/.030 .959/.026 .944/.044 .956/.017 
WAR 2.26/1.56 3.74/2.21 4.29/2.50 3.31/1.75 2.61/2.37 2.57/1.04 
The repeated measures ANOVA for position players only showed a statistical 
significance between years for WAR. A Bonferroni post hoc test was then run to see which years 
there was a statistically significant difference. The test showed that there was a significant 
difference between the season two years before the new contract and first year of the new 
contract (p=.007) and the first year of the new contract and career averages (p=.022).  
Once again a paired sample t-test was run to compare the season prior to the new contract 
and the first season of the new contract because of the large difference in means between the two 
years although the repeated measures ANOVA did not show any statistical significance for any 
of the performance measures. The paired samples t-test was run for ERA, WHIP, and WAR, but 
only WHIP came back significant (p=.05). Graphs showing the differences between years for 
each statistical category are provided in the appendix. 
The results of this study for starting pitchers did not support hypotheses 1 and 3 as well 
as the expectancy theory predictions associated with the two, while providing some support for 
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hypothesis 2. Interestingly, not only was hypothesis one rejected but the data was completely 
opposite of what was hypothesized. According to the hypothesis and expectancy theory’s 
predictions a player’s performance should decline during the first year of a new contract due to a 
decrease in instrumentality. Conversely, as seen in table 3, the means improved in each statistical 
category from the year prior to the new contract and the first year of the new contract, although 
the difference between the two years was only found statistically significant for WHIP (as 
mentioned above).    
Just as with position players hypothesis 2 was partially accepted as performance 
improved between the year two years prior to the new contract and year prior to the new contract 
in each statistical category with the exception of FPCT. It was only partially accepted however 
because the means of each performance figure decreased between the middle year(s) of the new 
contract and last year of the new contract. It is also important to note that each of these statistical 
differences, although large in the context of baseball were not shown to be statistically 
significant. 
The final hypothesis that multi-year contracts decrease a player’s motivation to perform 
during the first year/few years of a contract was rejected. In order for this hypothesis to have 
been accepted there would have had to have been a significant decrease between a player’s 
performance during the early years of a new contract and career averages. However performance 
figures were actually better during the first few years of the contract as compared to career 
averages. Once again the direction was opposite of what expectancy theory predicts. Although it 
is important to note that career average performance was only higher than performance during 
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the season two years prior to the new contract as well as ERA and FPCT during the last year of 





 This study provides further evidence to Ahlstrom et. al (1999) and Martin et. al (2011) 
findings that position players motivation to perform and subsequently their performance 
decreases during the first year of a new contract. It also provides insight into the effects of 
expectancy theory on starting pitchers, which had not previously been analyzed. The results of 
this study are very interesting in that they show some support for expectancy theories predictions 
as related to performance for position players however are almost reverse of what is predicted for 
starting pitchers. The results show that for position players performance tends to decrease during 
the first year of a new contract as compared to the year prior to the new contract in every 
statistical category and although these differences were not shown to be statistically significant 
in the repeated measures ANOVA, BA, SLG, OBP, and WAR were all shown to be significant in 
the paired samples t-test. From this it can be reasonably presumed that a position player’s 
motivation to perform is higher during the year prior to the new contract than the first year of the 
new contract. It is fascinating however that the first year of the new contracts performance, 
although significantly lower than the year prior to the new contract is still in line with the 
players’ career averages. This could mean that players are not motivated to perform at their 
highest level any season other than the one prior to signing a new contract. 
 Conversely starting pitcher performance actually increased in each statistical category 
during the first year of a new contract in relation to the year prior to the new contract and every 
other season. However this difference was not found to be statistically significant for any 
performance measure as analyzed by the repeated measures analysis and only WHIP for the 
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paired sample t-test. These results as well as the lack of statistical significance could be 
attributed to the small sample size of 20. Another possible explanation for the increase in 
performance during the first year of a new contract could be that starting pitchers are not solely 
motivated by money but rather other factors such as the location with which the team is located, 
or praise from their teammates, coaches, and fans have an effect on their valence. Finally, 
starting pitchers may be motivated to prove that they do indeed deserve the contract of which 
they have just signed. This effect can be explained by equity theories predictions, which has yet 





 In a world where players are properly compensated for their performance and motivated 
to perform at their highest level each year, one could expect to see a perfect correlation between 
an MLB team’s yearly salaries and their on-field performance as well as no sharp or statistically 
significant changes in any performance measures from one year to the next.  The results of this 
study however shows that this is not currently the case and therefore MLB’s form of player 
compensation and its consequent effect on player motivation to perform can be improved. 
Previous studies such as Lackritz (1990) and Dinerstein (2007) suggest that the best way to pay 
players is annually, which conceptually makes a lot of sense from the perspective of expectancy 
theories predictions. As long as monetary compensation is a main driver of a player’s 
instrumentality and valence then their overall instrumentality should remain at a high level as 
long as a contract is not guaranteed for more than one year and their next year’s salary is linked 
to their previous year’s performance. Although this makes sense conceptually it may not work in 
the context of baseball. This is because by only offering a player a one year contract this means 
that after that one year they are free to sign with the team that offers them the most money. It 
could be argued, that this would cause an increase in overall player salaries, as a bidding war 
ensues among teams for the highest performing athletes, as well as high performing players to 
move from teams with low payrolls to those with high. Currently one of the main reasons why 
organizations sign players to long term contracts is so that they don’t have to worry about them 
leaving their organization unless they are traded. There is also no guarantee that just because the 
player performed at a certain level the year previous that their numbers will be the same that 
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year. Although expectancy theory predicts that by offering one year contracts a player may be 
motivated to perform at his highest level, there are other outside variables of which a player has 
no control, such as injury, that could affect performance. This means that this system could still 
result in a correlation between MLB team yearly salary and on-field performance that is less than 
perfect. 
 I recommend that Major League Baseball’s organizations adopt a system similar to that 
used in the sales industry:  players are signed to long term contracts with a certain amount of 
guaranteed money based on previous performance and negotiated bonuses for reaching specific 
statistical milestones. This resembles the commission of a sales employee. This system allows 
organizations to sign players to long term contracts without being at the total mercy of the 
individual to perform at the predicted level each year. It also provides motivation for players to 
perform at their highest level since pay is directly linked to performance, thus increasing 
instrumentality regardless of how the rest of their team is performing. Thus, allaying the effects 
of a decrease in player motivation associated with his team being out of playoff contention. Since 
actual performance or output is directly linked to pay a team can expect for their yearly win-loss 
record or on-field performance to be closely related to their yearly team salary. An example of 
how such a contract would work with relation to home run (HR) incentives is presented in Table 
6. 
 One of the key difficulties with changing MLB’s current form of player compensation is 
the strength of Major League Baseball’s Players Association (MLBPA) and whether they 
approve of the changes. However under this system players would have the potential to earn 
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more money than they are currently. They would just have to earn it. Thus, there is reason to 
believe that the MLBPA may approve the change. This system will mitigate the effects of 
contract where players spend the majority or a large portion of their contract on the disabled list, 
producing numbers significantly lower than projected or previously earned. A team would only 
be liable for paying the players their guaranteed portion of the contract which would be quite 
small in comparison to what an organization such as the Yankees are losing in a contract such as 
Alex Rodriguez’s.  
The main drawback to this system is the fact that organizations will not have a fixed team 
salary and may end up spending much more or much less than expected. However through the 
use of projections and analysis of previous performance, such as what is currently used to 
determine a player’s compensation, teams should be able to develop ballpark figures as to what 
their team salary will be. On the other hand although they may end up spending a little more than 
projected they will be reaping the benefits of higher than expected performance and would not 
have to worry as much about paying their players large sums of money and not seeing a positive 
outcome on the field. Another issue to discuss is the possible “cheating of the system” by players 
or teams. For example a team who is out of playoff contention sitting a player so that they do not 
reach certain statistical milestones associated with pay increases or players developing phony 
injuries so that specific performance measures do not decrease below the milestone associated 
with a pay increase. However these types of problems can be eradicated by instituting clauses in 
contracts where a team must play a player a certain number of games or on the flip side the 
player must play a certain number of games with a specific percentage coming late in the season 
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in order to be eligible for the pay increases. It is important to note that in order for this system to 
work the statistical categories associated with bonuses should be individualistic while linked to 
overall team performance. This will decrease a player’s feelings of in-equity when playing for a 
lower performing team. Further studies would need to be conducted in order to determine what 
these statistical categories should be and the size of the pay increase associated with reaching 
certain statistical milestones.  
Table 6 Recommended Systems Compensation Structure Example 
Base Salary $2,500,000 
HR Incentives Bonus 
20-25 HR $1,000,000 
26-30 HR $2,500,000 
31-35 HR $3,000,000 
36-40 HR $4,000,000 
Etc. Etc 




Limitations and Future Research 
 The results presented in this study have certain limitations in terms of analysis. One is the 
relatively small sample size. Due to the difficulty in acquiring both complete and accurate data 
with respect to MLB player contract terms only those players who were on an active roster in 
2012 and reached the subsequent criteria for this study were able to be included. As a result only 
65 total players, 45 position players, and 20 starting pitchers were included. This small sample 
size may have prevented some of the differences in means between years to be shown as 
statistically significant. 
 Another limitation is performance figures used. Each of the figures were chosen due to 
their use in previous studies or their importance in determining a players level of compensation. 
However, they may not have equally shown the differences in a players increase in or decrease in 
motivation. For example, if a player is less motivated and thus spends less time in the batting 
cage what affect if any would this have on fielding percentage or vice versa? 
 Finally, this study assumes that a player’s level of compensation or pay is the primary 
reward associated with an individual’s instrumentality and ultimately has a high valence. 
However there may be other factors that are more important to certain players such as the 
location with which the team is located, or praise from their teammates, coaches, and fans. 





 This study provides further evidence that expectancy theory’s predictions apply in the 
context of Major League Baseball positions players. This is evident by the decrease in 
performance for position players in every statistical category from the season prior to the new 
contract and the first season of the new contract. This study also presents interesting finding with 
respect to starting pitchers and expectancy theory’s predictions as the results of the statistical 
analysis were opposite of what expectancy theory predicts. Further research will be needed to 
understand the exact reasoning behind the starting pitchers performance results as this is the 










Appendix: Statistical Analysis Data  
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